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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NARR, EAID, ISUS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY/DINITZ MEETING FEBRUARY 7, 1977

1. SUMMARY. DINITZ DELIVERED ORAL PRESENTATION TO THE SECRETARY CALLING FOR ISSUE OF SYRIAN FORCE IN NABATIYAH AREA TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE SECRETARY'S TRIP AND SUGGESTING THAT FURTHER PERIOD OF SYRIAN PRESENCE FOR COLLECTING MILITARY EQUIPMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED PURELY LEBANESE FORCE THEN REPLACED IT. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED POSSIBLE INTERIM STEP INVOLVING PARTIAL SYRIAN PULLBACK AND INTRODUCTION OF LEBANESE FORCE INTO NABATIYAH WHICH DEPARTMENT WOULD CONVEY TO ISRAELIS LATER IN DAY. DINITZ VOICED GOI UNHAPPINESS OVER TURNDOWN ON KFIRS FOR ECUADOR. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS DIFFICULT DECISION AT LENGTH WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE SECRETARY WELCOMED AS CONSTRUCTIVE DINITZ' SUGGESTION OF U.S.-ISRAELI

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 028945

REVIEW OF WAYS TO FOSTER ISRAELI PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS TO REDUCE ISRAELI DEPENDENCE ON U.S. ECONOMIC AID. DINITZ PREDICTED MATTER WOULD ARISE DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO ISRAEL. DINITZ SAID ARTICLE ON CBU FOR ISRAEL AND DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT THAT ENTIRE PACKAGE OF WHICH CBUS WERE A PART WAS UNDER REVIEW WERE BEING DRAMATIZED BY ISRAELI MEDIA. HABIB EXPLAINED CONGRESSIONAL ASPECT OF CBU

ELEMENT IN PACKAGE, AND THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER AND GET BACK TO DINITZ. WHEN DINITZ REQUESTED

PLO REP JIRYIS NOT BE GIVEN U.S. VISA, THE SECRETARY SAID NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. CONCERNING HIS TRIP TO AREA, THE SECRETARY SAID, AS HE HAD NOTED TO ARAB AMBASSADORS EARLIER IN DAY, THAT HE HOPED GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WOULD PRESERVE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY UNTIL AFTER HE HAD CHANCE TO REVIEW SITUATION WITH THEM AND UNDERLINED HIS VIEW THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGRESS IN 1977 WAS CRITICAL. END SUMMARY.

2. THE SECRETARY, DEPUTY SECRETARY, UNDER SECRETARY HABIB AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON MET FEBRUARY 7 AT THE SECRETARY'S REQUEST WITH AMBASSADOR DINITZ AND MINISTER BAR-ON. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED HE HAD WANTED TO TALK WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF EACH COUNTRY HE WOULD BE VISITING ON HIS TRIP IN PREPARATION FOR HIS MISSION. HE SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADOR DINITZ USE MEETING TO REVIEW BILATERAL MATTERS.

3.
SOUTHERN LEBANON.

4.
DINITZ SAID THAT FOLLOWING TALK BETWEEN ALLON AND CHARGE IN TEL AVIV HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO RELATE FOLLOWING ORALLY. ISRAEL APPRECIATED SECRETARY'S ROLE IN ARRANGING CONTACTS CONCERNING SOUTHERN LEBANON SITUATION. ISRAEL FELT SYRIAN MOVE INTO NABATIYAH HAD FAR REACHING IMPLICATIONS AND UNDERMINED STATUS QUO. ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT IT AS FAIT ACCOMPLI, AND PREVIOUS US-SYRIAN AND US-ISRAELI UNDERSTANDING HAD TO BE RESTORED. PLACEMENT OF TROOPS OF OTHER NAT-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 028945

IONALITIES IN AREA ALSO WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED--ONLY LEBANESE FORCE UNDER GOL CONTROL. ISRAEL HAD EXERCISED MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN ORDER NOT TO UPSET MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND GIVE US DIPLOMACY CHANCE TO SUCCEED, BUT ISRAEL HAD DISTINCT IMPRESSION SYRIA WAS DRAGGING FEET. ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO MAKE THINGS EASIER FOR SYRIA BY AGREEING TO TEMPORARY STAY OF SYRIAN FORCE TO COLLECT EQUIPMENT. ISRAEL WAS IMPRESSED BY GOL EFFORT TO FIND REPLACEMENT FORCE. ISRAEL ASKED THAT SUBJECT BE BEHIND US WHEN THE SECRETARY CAME TO MIDDLE EAST. ISRAEL BELIEVED THIS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO WIDER US-ISRAELI INTERESTS.

5.
DINITZ CONTINUED THAT TENSION WAS MOUNTING BETWEEN CHRISTIAN FORCES IN LEBANON ON ONE HAND AND SARKIS AND SYRIANS ON OTHER. IF TENSION WORSENER, THERE COULD BE EXPLOSION IN LEBANON, AND ISRAEL HOPED US WOULD TALK WITH OTHER CHRISTIAN ELEMENTS BESIDES SARKIS. ISRAEL WOULD APPRECIATE THE SECRETARY'S PERSONAL ATTENTION TO PROBLEM. MATTER INVOLVED CREDIBILITY OF ISRAEL AND, ISRAEL BELIEVED, CREDIBILITY OF US. IT WAS NOT QUESTION OF PRESTIGE BUT CREDIBILITY, WHICH WAS IMPORTANT FOR SMALL COUNTRY FOR SAKE OF DETERRENCE. ISRAEL HAD INFORMATION FROM RELIABLE SOURCE THAT SINCE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 4-5 TERRORISTS HAD BEEN TAKING WEAPONS

OUT OF NABATIYAH AREA, PROBABLY TOWARD SOUTH, WHICH INCREASED ISRAEL'S CONCERN ABOUT PRESENCE OF SYRIAN FORCE.

6.

THE SECRETARY ASSURED DINITZ HE WAS FOLLOWING PERSONALLY OUR ATTEMPTS TO MOVE SITUATION TO SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION AND WOULD CONTINUE. WE WOULD HAVE ORAL MESSAGE FOR ISRAEL AFTER MEETING WITH SUGGESTION OF HOW WE MIGHT

PROCEED TO WORK OUT TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE SECRETARY COULD FOLLOW UP ON WITH LEBANESE AND SYRIANS DURING HIS TRIP. IDEA WAS BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH GOL; ANSWERING DINITZ, THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD NOT HEARD SECOND TIME FROM SARG. HABIB EXPLAINED IDEA CENTERED ON PULLBACK OF

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 028945

SYRIA FROM SOUTH OF NABATIYAH TO NORTH AND EAST BUT ALONG LINE STILL FURTHER SOUTH THAN SYRIANS PREVIOUSLY WERE LOCATED. AS PART OF THIS INTERIM STEP BUTROS WOULD TRY TO PUT LEBANESE FORCE IN NABATIYAH ITSELF.

ISRAELI TALKS WITH IVORY COAST AND USSR.

DINITZ SAID THAT IN SPIRIT OF OPENNESS OF OUR RELATIONS RABIN WANTED TO CONVEY TO THE SECRETARY GIST OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY. DINITZ PRESENTED WRITTEN SUMMARY REQUESTING CIRCULATION BE LIMITED. DINITZ SAID HE ALSO WAS INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER OUTLINE OF ISRAELI-SOVIET TALK IN NEW YORK AND PRESENTED PAPER. WHEN ASKED IF MEETING HAD OCCURRED AT SOVIET INITIATIVE DINITZ EXPLAINED THAT INITIATIVE WAS OBSCURE. HE MENTIONED THAT AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN REPEATEDLY PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH DINITZ, WHICH DINITZ REGULARLY DECLINED AS EXERCISE IN FUTILITY. DINITZ FELT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT GIVE TO SOVIETS CREDENTIALS OF TALKING WITH BOTH SIDES WHEN SOVIETS DID NOT OFFER ANYTHING IN RETURN.

9.

KFIR AIRCRAFT FOR ECUADOR.

10.

DINITZ SAID ALLON HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO CONVEY FOLLOWING POINTS. ISRAEL DID NOT BELIEVE US NEGATIVE DECISION WOULD PREVENT TRANSFER TO ECUADOR OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY IN QUESTION BUT WOULD ONLY GIVE COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE TO FRANCE. FACT THAT US COMPANY HAD OFFERED F-5 TO ECUADOR, WHICH WAS ONLY SOMEWHAT INFERIOR TO KFIR, MADE IT HARD FOR ISRAEL TO SWALLOW US REASONING FOR ITS DECISION. THE SECRETARY SAID SUCH US OFFER TO ECUADOR HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. HABIB EXPLAINED F-5 WAS INFERIOR AIRCRAFT, AND ITS AVAILABILITY TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WAS NOT THE POINT. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE AND THE PRESIDENT HAD DISCUSSED THIS MATTER AT LENGTH BEFORE ARRIVING AT DECISION, WHICH WAS DIFFICULT. DINITZ PREDICTED THAT ISRAEL DURING SECRETARY'S VISIT WOULD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 028945

NOT SEEK CHANGE IN DECISION BUT "WOULD WANT TO EXPLAIN TO THE SECRETARY ITS ECONOMIC EFFECT.

11.

US ECONOMIC AID.

12.

DINITZ EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S GRATITUDE FOR ADMINISTRATION'S INCREASE IN ITS REQUEST TO CONGRESS FOR SECURITY

SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL. ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT FOR LONG RANGE SITUATION IT NEEDED TO BE IN POSITION TO PRODUCE AND SELL MORE IN ORDER NOT TO NEED ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC AID. DINITZ HOPED THAT THIS PROPOSITION COULD BE DISCUSSED. THE SECRETARY WELCOMED DINITZ'S SUGGESTION, MADE EARLIER THROUGH HABIB, AS CONSTRUCTIVE. HABIB CONFIRMED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ALREADY INSTRUCTED THAT PREPARATIONS BE MADE. DINITZ PREDICTED MATTER WOULD BE RAISED WITH THE SECRETARY IN ISRAEL.

13.

CBU

14.

DINITZ SAID ISRAELIS WERE DISTURBED BY FEBRUARY 6 WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE AND BY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 7 BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN THAT QUESTION WAS UNDER REVIEW. ISRAEL HAD UNDERSTOOD US HAD ALREADY TAKEN DECISION, AND ONLY MODALITIES WERE UNDER REVIEW. ISRAELI MEDIA WERE BLOWING SITUATION OUT OF PERSPECTIVE. HABIB EXPLAINED THAT CBU ELEMENT IN PACKAGE TECHNICALLY DID NOT HAVE TO GO TO CONGRESS, BUT CONGRESS WAS SEIZED WITH MATTER. PAPER WAS BEING PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION AND LEAK EVIDENTLY WAS EFFORT TO TAKE MATTER OUT OF THE SECRETARY'S HANDS. DINITZ SUGGESTED THAT SPOKESMAN STATE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN IN PRINCIPLE, AND MODALITIES WERE BEING WORKED OUT. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED ISRAEL'S PROBLEM IN SUGGESTION THAT ALL FOUR ELEMENTS OF PACKAGE WERE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD DIG INTO MATTER AND GIVE DINITZ FURTHER REPLY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 028945

15.

VISA FOR JIRYIS

16.

WHEN DINITZ RAISED THIS SUBJECT, THE SECRETARY CONFIRMED VISA APPLICATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED AND EXPLAINED NO AUTHORIZATION FOR VISA ISSUANCE HAD BEEN GIVEN. DINITZ REQUESTED THAT NONE BE GIVEN. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH AGAIN WITH DINITZ ON MATTER.

17. EC-9 MIDDLE EAST DECLARATION.

18.

DINITZ SAID ISRAEL APPRECIATED EFFORTS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AND OTHER US OFFICIALS TO HEAD OFF SUCH DECLARATION. HABIB NOTED THAT EC-9 HAD ONLY AGREED TO POSTPONE MATTER.

19. WALDHEIM MIDDLE EAST VISIT.

20.

DINITZ COMMENTED THAT ALLON'S FEELINGS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE STILL STRONGER THAN CONVEYED TO AMERICAN CHARGE IN TEL AVIV. WALDHEIM'S PEACE AWARD TO KING KHALID WAS ESPECIALLY UN-HELPFUL.

21. SECRETARY'S MIDDLE EAST TRIP.

22.

THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS SUGGESTING TO ALL THE PARTIES THAT THEY RETAIN MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY UNTIL HE HAD HAD A CHANCE TO HEAR THEIR VIEWS AND REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. HE WOULD NOT COME TO AREA WITH PLAN IN HAND BUT WANTED PARTIES' SUGGESTIONS. US REGARDED TRIP AS VERY IMPORTANT FOR DETERMINING US POSITION AND SUGGESTIONS ON HOW WE COULD FACILITATE PROGRESS. THIS WAS WHAT HE HAD TOLD ARAB AMBASSADORS EARLIER IN DAY. DINITZ SAID ISRAEL SHARED SECRETARY'S HOPE THAT PROGRESS COULD BE ACHIEVED AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SECRETARY'S VISIT. THE SECRETARY ADDED HE FELT IT CRITICAL THAT PROGRESS BE MADE THIS YEAR.

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PAGE 07 STATE 028945

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